China buys oil but sells the world the tools to consume less of it. 

A democracy can retain its borders and military yet lose the ability to defend itself if public trust in its institutions erodes. A great power can dominate the seas without being able to guarantee freedom of navigation. To understand these phenomena, one map is not enough. Energy and technology, security and information, economics and geopolitics must be viewed together.

This is the insight at the heart of Maurizio Molinari’s Le mappe per capire il potere. I dieci scenari interconnessi del nostro mondo (Maps for Understanding Power: Ten Interconnected Scenarios Shaping Our World), published by Rizzoli in 2026. A work of considerable maturity and ambition, the book combines strategic depth with exceptional clarity. Drawing on data and experience, Molinari advances a compelling argument: power is changing shape, and recognizing those changes requires a new way of looking at the world.

The book’s 10 maps offer a method for understanding that transformation. No single map can explain a world in which geopolitics, weapons, energy, trade routes, technology, financial power, critical resources, digital influence, demographics, and the rivalry between democracies and autocracies continually shape one another. Viewed together, the maps reveal dependencies, vulnerabilities, and sources of leverage that would remain invisible if each were examined in isolation. The book makes complexity comprehensible without oversimplifying it.

The cover of Maurizio Molinari’s new book, Le mappe per capire il potere. I dieci scenari interconnessi del nostro mondo.

The term “coopetition” captures the contradictions of our time.

The United States and China are competing for global primacy while remaining unable to abandon the trade ties that bind them. They negotiate tariffs even as they vie for leadership in strategic technologies. Interdependence raises the cost of confrontation and shifts power toward those who depend less on others — or know how to turn other countries’ dependence into leverage. Yet weakening a rival can also undermine one’s own strength. That is the contradiction diplomacy must manage.

The distinction between “oil states” and “electric states” reveals another tension. Some countries seek to preserve the influence they have built through hydrocarbons; others are trying to gain power through electrification. President Donald Trump uses America’s abundant oil and gas as strategic leverage, while Beijing seeks to reduce its dependence on imports passing through vulnerable chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca.

Energy power depends not only on control of resources but also on the technologies that transform them and the networks that distribute them. A deposit of raw materials is not enough if other countries control the processing. Artificial intelligence adds another constraint: leadership in computing power requires electricity. The digital future needs power, too.

These dependencies have a concrete geography.

The Strait of Hormuz concentrates energy supplies vital to the global economy. The Arctic is opening a new Great Game over shipping routes, resources, and military presence. In the Red Sea, attacks on shipping impose costs around the world. War can alter a trade route; higher transportation costs can disrupt production and force governments to reconsider their choices.

Controlling flows means influencing what other countries produce, consume, and finance. A country does not need permanent control of a shipping lane to exert power over it. It may be enough to disrupt traffic, threaten the route, or make passage prohibitively expensive.

Corporate calculations are changing, too. Producing goods wherever costs are lowest making sense as long as supply chains remain reliable. But efficiency must now be weighed against resilience and the risks of dependence.

Pax Silica translates the reliability of technology supply chains into strategic relationships. Semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and quantum computing are shaping investment decisions and alliances. Security considerations are entering corporate balance sheets, while businesses themselves are becoming part of national security calculations.

The “democratization” of warfare is also changing the relationship between resources and results. Inexpensive drones can destroy costly military equipment; cyberattacks can paralyze essential services.

Inflicting damage can cost far less than preventing it.

Finance reveals a different kind of asymmetry. The dollar gives the United States leverage that cannot be explained by military superiority alone. Challenging American dominance does not mean having a viable alternative. The yuan faces the constraints of China’s capital controls, while the euro is hampered by Europe’s political fragmentation. Digital currencies and new payment systems are changing the tools, but not the underlying issue of trust.

Power depends not simply on what a country possesses, but on what it can turn into strength. The principle applies to the geopolitics of water, grain, and rare earth elements. It applies even more forcefully to demographics, which are becoming a geopolitical factor in their own right.

Africa’s population is growing, while Europe and China are aging. India is following a different trajectory.

But demographic numbers translate into power only when they are converted into education, employment, technology, productive capacity, and political cohesion.

Against this backdrop, control over perceptions becomes critical. “Cognitive dominance” can weaken a society without occupying its territory, shape public opinion, deepen internal divisions, and paralyze decision-making. Artificial intelligence makes this pressure faster and more pervasive. That is why, Molinari argues, “cognitive resilience” is becoming part of national security.

Protecting borders, networks, and infrastructure is not enough. Societies must also preserve their ability to distinguish fact from falsehood, make informed decisions, and respond to threats.

Tomorrow’s power rankings will depend less on the mere possession of resources and more on the ability to convert them into economic, technological, political, and social strength.

The final map, which examines democracies and autocracies, gives the book an additional layer of political significance. The “democratic recession” is fueled by both external pressure and internal failures.

Molinari weighs resolve against prudence: deterring adversaries, choosing which battles to fight, and preserving opportunities for cooperation. Technology can strengthen authoritarian control, while wealth alone cannot guarantee democratic consent. Competition is increasingly about the ability to govern, not just the ability to arm.

Defending freedom requires strength, but it also requires the capacity to correct mistakes and deliver results for citizens.

The book brings these challenges together in a unified strategic vision.

It is a masterful work of analysis and a compass for understanding the 21st century. Molinari’s maps do more than show where power lies. They reveal where it is shifting to.